Japan Election Wrap: Will Sanae Takaichi Ignite a New Rare Earth Showdown?

On February 8th local time, Japan’s House of Representatives election concluded, setting a post-WWII record with just 16 days between the lower house’s dissolution and polling. The ruling coalition of the LDP and Nippon Ishin no Kai won a landslide 352 seats—well over half of the 465 total—securing Sanae Takaichi’s continued role as Japan’s Prime Minister. The fragmented opposition failed to counterbalance the coalition, ensuring Takaichi’s radical governance will persist, with far-reaching effects on Japan’s rare earth strategy and global maneuvering.

The election’s efficiency stemmed from Takaichi’s camp’s precise political control and shrewd campaign tactics. In just 16 days, Japan finished candidate registration, rallies, voting, and vote counting, with 1,284 candidates vying for 465 seats. Results reflect tentative public approval of Takaichi’s agenda, especially her core priorities: “economic security first” and “supply chain autonomy.” Rare earths—“industrial vitamins” for Japan’s high-end manufacturing, electronics, and defense—are central to this strategy, making them a key campaign talking point.

Japan’s key industries depend heavily on rare earths, but its land reserves are critically low; its only land mine, Hokkaido’s Saika Mine, closed in 2018 due to high costs. Currently, 71.9% of its rare earth imports come from China, with nearly 100% reliance on China for heavy rare earths (vital for high-end and military use). Takaichi’s camp hypes this as a “security risk” while downplaying alternative sources like Brazil and Australia, justifying its radical agenda.

Ahead of the election, Takaichi’s camp politicized rare earths. 48 hours before polling, Japanese media hyped “China approving rare earth exports,” which Takaichi framed as proof of her hardline diplomacy’s success to mislead voters. In reality, China’s controls are not a ban but a targeted review to block military use; the “resumed exports” were just backlogged, vetted civilian low-end orders. Critical heavy rare earths remain strictly controlled—a deliberate misrepresentation by Takaichi’s camp.

Post-re-election, Takaichi’s government will accelerate “de-Chinaizing” Japan’s rare earth supply chain. A key step is a March U.S. visit to meet Trump, focusing on deep-sea rare earth development around Minamitorishima Island. However, this faces steep hurdles: unproven deep-sea technology, high costs, and environmental concerns make commercial production a distant prospect, failing to ease supply pressures.

Japan is also leading a “54-nation Critical Minerals Alliance” to build a China-independent supply system, plus ramping up recycling and alternative material R&D. This will likely fail: China dominates rare earth reserves and refining technology; the alliance lacks coordination; and short-term breakthroughs are unlikely. Japan’s key industries will still face severe rare earth restrictions.

Notably, Takaichi’s rare earth strategy is tied to her anti-China stance and Japan-U.S. alliance efforts. She plans to boost defense budgets post-re-election, increasing military rare earth demand. China’s targeted controls hit Japan’s “military-civilian integration” weakness—many firms work in both civilian and defense sectors—undermining supply chain stability. Takaichi’s “de-Chinaization” is political ambition; forced “decoupling” will cost Japan heavily.

As election hype fades, political grandstanding can’t replace industrial reality. For Japan, true supply chain security lies in acknowledging shortcomings, abandoning confrontation, and integrating into the global rare earth chain via dialogue and cooperation. For the world, this rare earth game mirrors great power supply chain competition—balancing strategic security and cooperation is a shared challenge.